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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Supreme Court 
Norman J. Hayes, Respondent,  

v. 

State of South Carolina, Petitioner. 

Appellate Case No. 2015-002294 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
	
Appeal from Lexington County 

Edward W. Miller, Post-Conviction Relief Judge
	
Opinion No. 27676 

Heard October 20, 2016 – Filed November 9, 2016 

CERTIORARI DIMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY 

GRANTED 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 
Attorney General Patrick Lowell Schmeckpeper, both of 
Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Appellate Defender Laura Ruth Baer, of Columbia, for 
Respondent. 
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PER CURIAM: We granted a writ of certiorari to review the Court of 
Appeals decision in Hayes v. State, 413 S.C. 553, 777 S.E.2d 6 (Ct. App. 2015). 
After careful consideration of the appendices and briefs, the writ of certiorari 
is 
DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., 
concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Karen A. Forman, Appellant, 
v. 
South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and 
Regulation, State Board of Social Work Examiners, 
Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-000285 
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
S. Phillip Lenski Administrative Law Judge 
 John D. McLeod Administrative Law Judge 
Opinion No. 5453 

Heard November 10, 2015 – Filed November 9, 2016 

AFFIRMED 
Thomas Franklin McDow, IV, and Erin K Urquhart, both 
of McDow and Urquhart, LLC, of Rock Hill, for 
Appellant. 
Prentiss Counts Shealey and Megan Joan Flannery, of 
Columbia, for Respondents. 
HUFF, J.:  Karen Forman appeals the decision of the Administrative Law Court 
(ALC) affirming the order of the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing 
and Regulation, State Board of Social Work Examiners (Board) prohibiting her 
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from working as a Guardian ad Litem (GAL) and barring her from all independent 
social work practice. We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Forman has a master's degree in social work and became a Licensed Master Social 
Worker (LMSW) in the early 1990s. At the time of the Board's action, she also 
had become a Licensed Independent Social Worker-Clinical Practice (LISW-CP).  
She primarily worked as a GAL and has served on over 150 cases.  On August 19, 
2009, the Board served Forman with a Notice of Charges (Notice) alleging she had 
engaged in misconduct in violation of the Social Work Examiners Practice Act.1 
The Notice was based upon Forman's work as a GAL in two family court private 
custody actions. The Notice alleged Forman made recommendations to the family 
court without interviewing all of the parties involved, conducting a full 
investigation of all relevant documents and allegations that may be relevant, or 
supporting her conclusions with a full report.  In addition, the Notice alleged 
Forman failed to disclose to the family court the Board had placed her license on 
probation, she had billed for services she had not performed, and she had failed to 
disclose potential conflicts of interest.   
In responding to the Notice, Forman asserted that in Case I, she followed the GAL 
statute and had done nothing wrong.  For Case II, she stated she believed the 
mother was mentally unstable and "was angry at me because she has no one left to 
target her anger toward." Forman filed a motion to dismiss contending she was not 
providing social work services and only the family court has authority over actions 
taken as a GAL. 
After a hearing, the Board determined Forman had committed fraud in violation of 
South Carolina Code Regulation 110-20(8) (2012) by representing she had 
performed services she had not performed.  It also found Forman had represented
herself as a LMSW without disclosing she had been placed in a probationary 
status.2  The Board ordered Forman to no longer work as a GAL.  It prohibited her 
from all independent practice and provided she may "engage only in supervised 
1 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40-63-5 through -300 (2011).

2 The Board held the State had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

Forman had failed to disclose a conflict of interest or that she had put her own 

financial interest ahead of her professional responsibility.   
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practice, within a recognized, organized setting such as social, medical, and 
governmental agencies."  It required her to submit to the Board semi-annually 
written reports from her supervisors for two years.   
Forman appealed to the ALC.  In its final order, the ALC rejected Forman's 
arguments she was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and the Board lacked 
authority to discipline her for her work as a GAL.  The ALC found substantial 
evidence supported the Board's decision she had violated section 40-63-110(B)(9) 
of the South Carolina Code (2011) and Regulation 110-20(8) by representing to the 
Board that she had performed services in the two family court cases that she did 
not perform. It reversed the Board's finding Forman was required to disclose her 
prior discipline in her GAL affidavit.  Because it found the Board's order was 
unclear whether this finding affected the sanctions, the ALC remanded the matter 
to the Board for reconsideration of the sanctions. 
On remand, the Board found Forman's failure to disclose the previous disciplinary 
action "played little, if any, role in its decision for the sanctions imposed."  
Accordingly, it imposed the same sanctions as in the original order.  The ALC 
affirmed this order. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES
I. Does quasi-judicial immunity apply to professional disciplinary proceedings? 
II. Are the Board's findings of fact supported by substantial evidence?  
III. Does the Board have subject matter jurisdiction to discipline Forman for her 
actions as a GAL and to prohibit her from serving as a GAL? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of agency decisions is governed by section 1-23-380 of the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) (Supp. 2015).  Osman v. S.C. Dep't of 
Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 382 S.C. 244, 248, 676 S.E.2d 672, 675 (2009).  
Pursuant to the APA: 
The court may not substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence 
17 

  
on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of 
the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. 
The court may reverse or modify the decision if 
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced 
because the administrative findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) affected by other error of law; 
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, 
and substantial evidence on the whole record; or 
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of 
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2015). 
 
"'Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that, considering the record as a whole, 
a reasonable mind would accept to support an administrative agency's action.'"  
Trimmier v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 405 S.C. 239, 246, 746 
S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Porter v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 333 
S.C. 12, 20, 507 S.E.2d 328, 332 (1998)).  "Furthermore, the possibility of drawing 
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent a court from 
concluding that substantial evidence supports an administrative agency's finding." 
Id. (quoting Porter, at 21, 507 S.E.2d at 332). 
 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
 
I. Judicial Immunity 
 
Forman argues quasi-judicial immunity afforded to GALs applies to professional 
disciplinary proceedings. She relies on Fleming v. Asbill, 326 S.C. 49, 55, 483 
S.E.2d 751, 754-55 (1997), in which the supreme court ruled GALs in private 
custody actions should be entitled to immunity from tort actions. 
 
In Fleming, the court held, 
18 

 [P]rivate persons appointed as guardians ad litem in 
private custody proceedings are afforded immunity for 
acts performed within the scope of their appointment.  
Because one of the guardian's roles is to act as a 
representative of the court, and because this role can only 
be fulfilled if the guardian is not exposed to a constant 
threat of lawsuits from disgruntled parties, a finding of 
quasi-judicial immunity is necessary.  Such a grant of 
immunity is crucial in order for guardians to properly 
discharge their duties. The immunity to which guardians 
ad litem are entitled is an absolute quasi-judicial 
immunity. 
 
Id. at 57, 483 S.E.2d at 755-56. 
 
Forman argues immunity from disciplinary proceedings is necessary to protect 
GALs from disgruntled parties.  However, the Board, not a disgruntled party, 
brought this action after investigating the complaints it received as required by 
section 40-1-80 of the South Carolina Code (2011).  In rejecting an argument 
similar to Forman's, the Washington Supreme Court explained why the policy 
reasons for immunity from civil suits are not applicable to disciplinary proceedings 
as follows: 
 
[A] disciplinary proceeding is not a civil suit against the 
expert, and the policies that underscore witness immunity 
do not apply. Disciplinary actions are different in 
character to civil actions. . . .  When we acknowledge 
these differences, it follows that a rule providing 
immunity from civil liability does not necessarily provide 
protection from professional discipline.  Just as a rule 
promulgated for professional discipline is inappropriate 
as a legal doctrine, a legal doctrine promulgated to 
achieve the full disclosure of facts may not provide 
immunity from a professional disciplinary proceeding.  
 
Deatherage v. State of Wash., Examining Bd. of Psychology, 948 P.2d 828, 831-32 
(Wash. 1997). The court further explained,  
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Permitting a professional to be subjected to discipline for 
unprofessional conduct . . . furthers the disciplinary 
board's goal of protecting the public. . . .  [T]he reason 
for immunity is that the court wants to preserve and 
enhance the judicial process.  However, eliminating any 
threat of punishment (except criminal perjury charges) 
extends absolute immunity beyond its historical reach.   
Id. at 832 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Forman does not cite any cases extending quasi-judicial immunity to professional 
disciplinary proceedings. However, in numerous cases in addition to Deatherage, 
courts have recognized immunity does not extend to such proceedings.  See Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (noting immunity of prosecutor from civil 
liability does not exempt his amenability to professional discipline); Lythgoe v. 
Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Alaska 1994) (upholding absolute immunity for a 
court-appointed custody investigator but noting additional safeguards exist,
including reporting a doctor's behavior to the medical boards); Budwin v. Am. 
Psychological Ass'n, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 459-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (explaining
"the reach of quasi-judicial immunity does not encompass disciplinary liability by 
a private, voluntary association" and concluding the doctrine of quasi-judicial 
immunity does not bar the American Psychological Association from disciplining 
an expert witness for the false representations and the wrongful refusal to produce 
documents); Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 877 A.2d 773, 781-82 (Conn. 2005) (noting 
factor supporting extension of absolute judicial immunity to court-appointed 
attorney for minors—existence of procedural safeguards in the system that would 
adequately protect against improper conduct—was met because such an attorney is 
subject to discipline for violations of the Code of Professional Conduct); Seibel v. 
Kemble, 631 P.2d 173,177 n.8, 180 (Haw. 1981) (holding court appointed 
psychiatrist was entitled to absolute immunity given to judges and other judicial 
officials but noting the psychiatrist's behavior could be reported to the medical 
boards for further action); McKay v. Owens, 937 P.2d 1222, 1232 (Idaho 1997) 
(explaining granting quasi-judicial immunity to a guardian does not leave the 
parties without recourse as "[t]he attorney-guardian is still subject to the Idaho 
Rules of Professional Conduct"); Curd v. Ky. State Bd. of Licensure for Prof'l 
Engineers & Land Surveyors, 433 S.W.3d 291, 299 (Ky. 2014) ("Extending 
absolute immunity to protect expert witnesses from the possibility of 
administrative discipline for their testimony stretches the concept beyond the point
20 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
of recognition."); State ex rel. Bird v. Weinstock, 864 S.W.2d 376, 386 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1993) ("Extension of judicial immunity to guardians ad litem in custody 
matters does not . . . remove all accountability.  There are numerous mechanisms 
in place to prevent abuse and misconduct.  Attorney guardians remain subject to 
the Rules of Professional Conduct."); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Dobbs, 94 
P.3d 31, 47 (Okla. 2004) ("[T]he witness immunity doctrine does not preclude 
imposition of professional discipline for a lawyer's perjury."); Huhta v. State Bd. of 
Med., 706 A.2d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (declining to extend judicial 
immunity to administrative disciplinary proceedings before the State Board of 
Medicine "because it is the Board in which the Commonwealth vests its trust to 
ensure the competency of practicing physicians and thereby protect the public"); 
id. ("It is the Board that is charged with the responsibility of overseeing the 
medical profession and determining the competency and fitness of an individual to 
practice medicine within the Commonwealth and we decline to handicap the Board 
in performing this important function."). 
The purpose of the Board is the protection of the public.  S.C. Code Ann.§ 40-1-40 
(2011); see also Wilson v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 305 S.C. 194, 196, 406 
S.E.2d 345, 346 (1991) ("The revocation of a physician's license . . . is designed 
not to punish the physician . . . but to protect the life, health and welfare of the 
people at large . . . ." (omissions in original) (quoting Levy v. Bd. of Registration & 
Discipline, 392 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (1979))).  Extension of quasi-judicial immunity 
to a licensee would hamper the Board in its execution of this vital public function.  
Accordingly, we hold quasi-judicial immunity for GALs does not extend to 
disciplinary proceedings. 
II. Findings of Fact 
Forman argues the Board's findings of fact are not correct.  We disagree.   
The Board found Forman had violated state statute and regulation by asserting she 
had complied with the GAL statute when she had not performed all of the duties 
the statute requires. See S.C. Code Ann. § 40-63-110(B)(9) (2011) (listing as a 
ground for discipline "the licensee has violated the principles of professional ethics 
or standards of conduct as adopted by the board and promulgated in 
regulations . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 110-20(8) (2012) ("A social worker shall 
not commit fraud and shall not represent that he performed services which he did 
not perform."). 
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The Board's expert witness, Jania Sommers, described how Forman failed to 
comply with the statutory requirements in her investigations of these cases.  See
S.C. Code Ann. 63-3-830(A)(2) (2010) (requiring a GAL to conduct "an 
independent, balanced, and impartial investigation to determine the facts relevant 
to the situation of the child and the family"); id. (setting forth requirements a GAL 
investigation "must include"). 
Forman offered explanations for the way she conducted her investigations, 
including asserting the matters settled before final, contested hearings were held, 
and thus, full reports were not necessary.  On appeal, while Forman acknowledges 
some of the Boards findings "may be true in a narrow, strict sense," she asserts 
"they are also incomplete and out of context."  However, given our standard of 
review, we conclude substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Board's
findings Forman committed fraud and represented she performed services that she 
had not performed.   
III. Jurisdiction 
Forman argues the Board did not have subject matter jurisdiction to make findings 
she failed to perform GAL responsibilities as required by statute.  She also asserts 
the family court has exclusive authority to appoint GALs and the Board's
prohibition of her working as a GAL is an unconstitutional usurpation of the family 
court's absolute discretion.  We disagree. 
"'Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general 
class to which the proceedings in question belong.'" Brown v. S.C. Dep't. of Health 
& Human Servs., 393 S.C. 11, 16, 709 S.E.2d 701, 704 (Ct. App. 2011)  
(quoting Majors v. S.C. Sec. Comm'n, 373 S.C. 153, 159, 644 S.E.2d 710, 713 
(2007)). "A court's subject matter jurisdiction is determined by whether it has the 
authority to hear the type of case in question.  Allison v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 394 
S.C. 185, 188, 714 S.E.2d 547, 549 (2011).  "This same principle applies to
administrative agencies."  Id.
The South Carolina General Assembly provided for the creation of the Board as 
administered by the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and 
Regulation. S.C. Code Ann. § 40-1-40(B) (2011).  It authorized the Board to 
investigate and discipline persons licensed by the Board.  S.C. Code Ann. §§40-63-
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 80 to -210 (2011). Thus, the Board clearly has authority to hear a disciplinary case 
of a licensed social worker. 
 
Forman argues the Board lacks jurisdiction or authority to prevent the family court 
from exercising its discretion in appointing a GAL or to prevent a family court 
appointee from serving as a GAL.  The Board has authority to "revoke, suspend, 
publicly reprimand, or otherwise restrict the practice or discipline a licensee when 
it is established that the licensee is guilty of misconduct as defined in this chapter."  
S.C. Code Ann. § 40-63-110 (2011).  Here, the Board disciplined Forman and 
restricted her to supervised practice.  It prohibited her from GAL work and 
independent practice. The family court, of course, "has absolute discretion in 
determining who will be appointed as a guardian ad litem in each case."  S.C. Code 
Ann. § 63-3-810 (2010). However, the decision whether to accept such an 
appointment lies in Forman, who either may comply with the Board's restrictions 
or face the consequences of noncompliance.   
 
Forman asserts her responsibilities as a GAL did not fall within the definition of 
the practice of independent social work because the definition includes mediation, 
which GALs are prohibited from engaging in and client education, which she 
asserts is "impossible" for a GAL as GALs do not have clients. Mediation and 
client education, however, are just two aspects encompassed by the broad and 
varied practice of independent social work.  The practice of independent social 
work-clinical practice is defined as follows:  
 
the professional application of social work theory, 
knowledge, methods, principles, values, and ethics, and 
the professional use of self to restore or enhance social, 
psychosocial, or biopsychosocial functioning of 
individuals, couples, families, groups, and direct clinical 
needs of organizations and communities. . . .  The 
practice of independent clinical social work includes case 
management, information and referral, mediation, client 
education, supervision of employees, consultation, 
research, advocacy, outcome evaluation, and expert 
testimony.   
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 40-63-20 (25) (2011).  This statute includes advocacy in the 
definition of independent clinical social work. See Townsend v. Townsend, 323 
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S.C. 309, 316, 474 S.E.2d 424, 428 (1996) ("Generally . . . a guardian ad litem 
must perform two distinct functions: (1) ascertaining the best interests of the ward, 
i.e., gathering information; and (2) advocating to the family court the ward's best 
interests. Thus, the guardian ad litem's role is neither wholly that of an inquisitor 
nor wholly that of an advocate; rather, it is a hybrid role.").   
 
Although Forman was not required to be a licensed social worker to be a GAL, she 
promoted herself with her credentials.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 40-63-30 (2011) 
(prohibiting use of designations such as "Social Worker" or "Licensed Master 
Social Worker", or initials such as "LMSW" or "LISW" unless licensed).  In 
written articles and continuing legal education presentations, Forman discussed the 
application of social work theory, knowledge, methods, and principles to GAL 
work. 
 
Furthermore, our supreme court has recognized a professional may be disciplined 
for actions the professional took while not engaged in the practice of his or her 
profession.  See S.C. Real Estate Comm'n v. Boineau, 267 S.C. 574, 579, 230 
S.E.2d 440, 441-42 (1976). For example, it found "Even as members of the bar are 
subject to disciplinary procedures for conduct not strictly related to the practice of 
law, realtors may have their licenses revoked for conduct not strictly related to a 
transaction in which they are acting as broker." Id. at 579, 230 S.E.2d at 442.3  
 
Forman also contends the Board could only sanction her if the family court found 
wrong-doing on her part. The family court's primary concern is the best interest of 
the child. See Harris v. Harris, 307 S.C. 351, 353, 415 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1992) 
("Family Court is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to ensure that, in all 
matters concerning a child, the best interest of the child is the paramount 
consideration."). The Board's primary interest is protecting the public through the 
licensure and discipline of social workers. See § 40-1-40. Just as a conviction by a 
court of competent jurisdiction is not a prerequisite to a board's exercise of its 
discretion in ordering a suspension of a license, a finding of wrongdoing by the 
3 Forman failed to challenge the ALC's ruling the Board has the ability to 
discipline a licensee for behavior in activities not strictly related to the licensed 
social work practice. Accordingly, this ruling is the law of the case.  See Atl. Coast 
Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 
(2012) ("[A]n unappealed ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case."). 
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family court is not required for the Board to discipline a social worker.  See 
Wagner v. Ezell, 249 S.C. 421, 433, 154 S.E.2d 731, 737 (1967) (rejecting 
argument that the Board of Examiners of Optometry had no authority to act in 
suspending a license until and unless a criminal conviction is brought about in a 
court of competent jurisdiction).
We hold the Board had authority to discipline Forman for her actions as a GAL 
and to issue the sanctions it imposed on Forman.   
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the order of the ALC is  
AFFIRMED. 

WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.   
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